If you pay Internet phone charges you may wish to download this page for offline viewing.  It is around ten A4 pages but is essential reading if you are interested in this section.

This is the letter of 22 August 2002 that started my dispute with Devon Library Services, a part of Devon County Council. It was sent to the Head of Library Services, Lynn Osborne. Her reply amounted to one terse paragraph. Later, the Chief Executive of Devon County Council (DCC) had to concede that my 'campaign' on privacy could be seen as being in the public interest. No further reply has been received from Mrs Osborne.

The whole of the library dispute as documented on this website revolves around Mrs Osborne's failure properly to discharge her public duty to reply in an appropriate manner to a letter from a taxpayer. The letter has been edited and text in purple added by way of explanation or commentary.

Data Security: Human Rights Act: Library Bylaws
People's Network (PN) computer systems in Devon libraries

I am writing to comment on the new computers in Sidmouth and Honiton Library especially. Letters published in The Independent on 21 June and the Western Morning News on 27 June refer in general terms. An article was also published in the Sidmouth Herald on 2 August. I would appreciate if you would have copies to hand when reading this letter. (they are all on this website too)

My primary purpose in writing is to encourage a logical review of the arrangements for PN computers in libraries, and that this should be undertaken as soon as practicable. I have no particular interest in broadcasting interim views of DCC in respect of the above matters but of course, the option will remain available. I do however feel personally aggrieved that so much taxpayers' money has been spent with (obviously) so little thought having been given to user requirements and the implications for system specification and design, and despite my comments about a year ago to two of your senior staff.

In a letter to me dated 8 August your colleague Roy Eden states that DCC will be completing the installation of 306 computers and peripheral hardware at a total resource cost (my estimate) probably in excess of £250,000.(It turned out to be £1,300,000!) Yet it is clear from discussions with your librarians and others in the UK that the whole PN exercise has been implemented perhaps within an over-hasty time scale without (say) even 5% of the budget having been spent on competent external advice. I hope you do not mind if I presume here that few if any of your staff are competent in matters of data protection or computer systems management. Consequences of the present debacle are painfully obvious even to casual lay observers. (In fairness, some libraries outside Devon have not done much better.)

By way of an introductory question therefore, would you agree that it might now be prudent to divert a small part of your PN or general IT budget to fund an initial assessment of how things have gone so badly wrong, and, more to the point for the future, how best to modify systems not only in Devon but throughout the UK? You might even gain for yourselves an accolade as recognised leaders in the field not only within 'library cliques' but more widely. I hope you will bear these ideas in mind and not take too negative a view of much of what follows.

Separate letter(s) have been sent to Jill Smith (correctly Gill Smith, DCC's Data Protection Officer). You should obtain copies. As a matter of courtesy you are informed that any telephone conversations will be recorded. I will not accept e-mail or fax communications from DCC. You are advised it would be counter productive for DCC or the police to threaten me with any type of prosecution related to these matters now or in the future. If you feel that there might be anything to be gained by a meeting I would need to consider this.

I wish to explain to you (and inter alia to Mrs Spence at Sidmouth) (Mrs Spence is the librarian in charge at Sidmouth) my general attitude towards senior DCC staff. My direct and extensive experience of DCC, of the Environment Department and of the traffic management sections, is that putting forward entirely supportable views based on good analysis and doing so politely is a waste of effort. (This refers to the Sidford Traffic Signals debacle during which DCC ignored views from a large number of residents, including over 1000 who signed one of the largest petitions ever produced in Sidmouth. It is described elsewhere on this website) Nevertheless, I do recognise that Library Services may be capable of adopting a more positive approach.

By way of introduction to the topics of leaflets and approach to privacy issues, I wish to bring to your attention the paragraph in your leaflet "Consideration for others". You ask people to respect other people's privacy and not to look at computer screens that are in use. Who wrote this? Obviously she has never lived in Sidmouth. May I educate you as to the realities of life? The first point is that most of the people who may be predisposed to intrude on privacy may not be other computer users so will (probably) not have read the leaflet anyway. This is a relevant point of logic and I hope therefore that it will appeal to you. (No harm in trying!)

Two pages of text have been condensed here. They were specific to Sidmouth and people living there.

Date of birth can be useful in getting past bank or mail order security, for example, and can be used to help gain access to sensitive BA records by phone. This is one reason why so many people have for years used as many false details as possible for all but Passport, Inland Revenue and similar purposes. It is also the reason why any such data on your systems should be encrypted and available to local staff on a need to know basis and only upon authority from your HQ. Indeed, there is no valid reason why exact date of birth needs to be collected for any library purpose and the data should therefore be erased from these and all similar systems throughout the UK. Please let me know your thoughts on this specific point.

A number of further questions follow, in no particular logical sequence or order of priority, and I would be grateful for your careful answers. I am anxious to ensure that DCC's position is correctly represented. Parts of this letter may be relevant to Gill Smith and Sue Pargeter (Ms Pargeter is a senior librarian at the HQ of Devon Library Services) and to your legal departments. It is of course for you to decide if you should continue to operate DCC library computer systems that would appear to breach Data Protection norms. Please consider this carefully. Casual outtake from your systems may continue if only by way of building a further log to illustrate your laughable security and lack of concern for privacy. This letter may be published by me in an edited form. It may not be published by you.

There now follow the 50 questions, none of which have been satisfactorily answered, and many of which have proven prescient in the light of more recent developments in Internet privacy and security as described elsewhere in this website.

1. I am told it is usual in other countries to site public access machines to afford some degree of privacy. Was it a deliberate policy by your Council to achieve the opposite in Sidmouth especially?

2. Who was primarily responsible for the layout of computers in Sidmouth and Honiton?

3. Did you take any advice on the siting of your new machines and if so from which professional body, consultant or commercial company? To your knowledge is your policy that of other UK libraries?

4. Are the booking systems for computers and for books lent out standard within all UK libraries and if not to your knowledge how many libraries in the UK use them? Please give supplier details.

5. Is central government or other authoritative guidance available on siting of computer equipment in public places, was this followed and where can I obtain copies? This question refers to both library desk and PN machines. I have been referred to the CILIP website but it appears to contain little of relevance.

6. It is desired to photograph the PN and booking out computers in your libraries as a part of showing good and bad practice. This can either be done with your help or covertly using equipment so small it can be concealed easily about the person. Please clarify your bylaws and any purported authority thereunder and state if you give your consent or otherwise.

7. Do you consider it acceptable for personal data held on library computers (name, address etc.) to be displayed on screens visible to third parties? I will take here an example of a young girl (perhaps aged 10 or 12 years) and a man standing nearby who desired improper advances. I have seen on your current systems names and addresses displayed, also names only on some screens - these can be read not only by persons standing alongside the person being served but from across issue desks in many libraries. A cardinal rule is that personal data should be displayed on screens only on a need to know basis. Why do your systems appear to do otherwise? Please comment fully.

8. Given the strict precautions in use in banks (for example) to prevent data capture by third parties and including use of special screens having a small viewing angle (used primarily in open plan situations), do you consider your arrangements satisfactory? It is of course quite a different matter if you ask someone for their name or address by way of confirmation. If in the circumstances of their proximity to another person they choose to divulge their personal details, that is a matter for them.

9.(This paragraph is further discussed within the credit card page of the Privacy section) If at a supermarket check-out a girl proffers a credit card and I can read it, then I know her name and she has in effect consented. Using a search technique on the Internet or using commercially available CD ROMs, I may then be able to find her address within seconds and ascertain if she lives alone. This is made difficult if her surname is Smith but a forename can narrow the search considerably. Few people are aware of how extensively privacy has already been compromised in the UK using data provided by Local Authorities. -see below also. Recently, there was a relevant High Court decision in favour of privacy and this is leading to an overhaul of electoral roll access in libraries and elsewhere. Please state in full the current DCC position. The discussion here is centred upon availability of details to a third party on library computer screens with no option on the part of borrowers to deny access to their personal data. There are problems even in having names written on library tickets and I shall be suggesting a review of procedures nationally. I believe credit cards may be redesigned also. The real problems will start when medical records are computerised by local amateurs and obtained by third parties.

10. Your system of using library card numbers for access to computers offers virtually no security. It may be easily be defeated in four different ways. You have directly facilitated two of them. Do you recognise you can have little to no confidence in linking numbers used to users, certainly not to a degree that would be necessary to support even proposed exclusion from the library under bylaws let alone any serious Court action? In your Terms and Conditions you promote your extensive surveillance capabilities "It is possible to identify sites visited and users responsible". Using your systems?! (these matters are discussed on a separate page of the website to show the ease with which DCC systems could be defeated and data extracted, see page 'data_outtake.htm' in privacy section)

11. On the other hand, I believe you may be compelled to allow access to reference computers by people who do not wish to be identified. I accept it may be some years before the law is clarified here. What please is your view of the current position in the UK and Europe? Do libraries in the UK use a common approach and if so according to what guidelines or Code of Practice? (this seems like a reasonable question and has been thrown into focus by discussion in the USA, see other pages on this website in the Privacy Section!)

12. If you refuse to make anonymous use of the Internet available to me will you instead agree to provide me free of charge with hard copies of all material that is available world-wide so that I may study it in private as I may now do for any book in your collection?

>13. You may have seen in the press concerns expressed about the RIP (Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act) in that DCC, for example, could misuse powers that may be ceded to it to snoop on persons using library computers, for example, to undertake work to help identify malfeasance, misfeasance or otherwise on the part of DCC. What specific procedures are in place on your computer systems to prevent such unauthorised access by the Executive? Are you prepared to admit there are none? (The RIP has subsequently been discussed in computer journals and elsewhere because of a proposal to resurrect much of the Act, early discussion of which caused an outcry. It seems likely the Act will be pushed through Parliament during the next Iraq crisis - a perfect time to bury the truth.)

14. The layout in Sidmouth has a number of direct and inescapable consequences for users. There is no privacy. The Internet is a legitimate source of advice. The few books in Sidmouth library on some medical conditions could be read 'in confidence' by (for example) a shy young person even if they did not have the courage to take a book out. If only Internet advice were to be available on a particular day, do you consider that the lack of privacy you have engineered might deter that person from seeking advice to the detriment of his/her medical condition? (This point has since been accepted as a valid concern in discussions with several librarians in different parts of the UK)

15. Data may easily be captured from screen by anyone with a reasonable memory. One early example will suffice. On 21 June I was able by ambling past screens and in full view of Mrs Spence to acquire a credit card number, name, address, etc. One particularly delectable young girl was writing a CV but as this was in Spanish or Italian I was really none the wiser. I have since amassed other data merely by casual observation, often from desk screens at various libraries. By your own calculated and deliberate actions as well as by incompetence you have rendered privacy impossible and risk of subsequent emotional or other harm to users more likely. Do you agree this specific point?

16. It is arguable you have failed in a common law duty of care not to put people at undue risk by compromising their privacy. You cannot sustain the argument that they had free choice to accept or not the Conditions of Use since the Internet may (increasingly) have been their only option for undertaking a desperate or important task. Acceptance of your Conditions of Use for People's Network machines is under duress, is resented and may be a breach of Article 8 of the Convention. Please give your views here. In respect of data capture, what would you intend to charge me with? Possession of eyesight and of memory?

17. Is any log kept of which web sites have been visited by each registered user and if so what procedures if any are in place to ensure that illicit use of library ticket numbers (howsoever obtained) cannot result in incorrect association between a user and website visits or e-mail links? Please give a full answer as this question is important in law. I will give you an example here and please bear in mind my knowledge of computers and the Internet is limited. I do however have some knowledge of surveillance and security systems.

The next few paragraphs have been condensed "to protect the innocent!"

18. It takes 2 minutes to set up an e-mail address using the name of a real person obtained from the electoral roll. I will use the example of XXXXX (not her real name). It took me one minute to find her address using a legitimate Internet method (not the phone book!). In what follows you may assume fact or fiction as you wish but rest assured that no electronic record exists to link me or my library number to any procedures.

19. Having set up this e-mail address links may be established and may be spawned by junk mail inputs to a range of sex sites. Most of these will be harmless. Your monitoring procedures may link XXXXXX's name to these, and indeed her library number may have been obtained for this purpose, yet she is innocent. How would you prove that sites linked to any person's name or visited using their library card number were in any way genuinely linked? You would be laughed out of court - and I would be happy to be a witness as to your incompetence and lack of due diligence. Even if you were to cause mere embarrassment by questioning XXXXX, and based on surveillance records that could be shown to have been collated negligently and/or without due care you could well be sued. I believe you could be forced to disclose your procedures and records. You might need to prove guilt before you could apply sanction. If any part or parts of your bylaws are invalidated under the Human Rights Act you should not seek to apply them. Please state if you are prepared to forward draft copies of your proposed new bylaws for my inspection.

20. It is accepted your staff have limited knowledge of technology. On several occasions I have had to explain to Mrs Spence how to use equipment. I have been pleased to do so. During Internet work outside of secure areas, sex screens can 'pop up'. If a member of your poorly trained staff were to see sexual displays he or she would first have to determine if they were offensive (a Court case in itself) then if the screen had been displayed deliberately or as an inadvertent pop up, then if the address had been sought deliberately or by accident and then if the user was really the person in whose name the terminal had been booked. I believe it is legal only for a police officer to demand a name and address. Your strident Terms and Conditions (these are shown elsewhere on the website, see end of page) suggest otherwise and are offensive if they purport to give authority that you do not in law possess. Please clarify your view of your authority, including purported right of jurisdiction over what is offensive and of detention. It is both a criminal offence and a civil matter to detain or to attempt to detain a person without legal authority. Redress and remedy may be sought.

21. Your libraries contain an array of smutty novels. In my view, their content is similar to the bulk of 'junk mail' sex inputs. Do you agree with this? Do you have a published policy that has been tested in Court in the last few years? Nevertheless, sites have been blocked when I have attempted briefly and with idle interest to view junk e-mail sent to me. I consider your actions discriminatory. (A recent ruling under the Human Rights Act has allowed hard-core pornography to be provided upon demand to prisoners in jail! I was here making the point that it is illogical for libraries to provide an array of smutty novels and yet go into overdrive pretending to be concerned about a few silly images on screen.)

22. What do your rules say about bringing a laptop into a library and viewing soft porn, much as one could buy a magazine en route and read it? Some titles are quite arresting . One I recall was being read by two girls on the M5 services a few years ago. I remember the text emblazoned across the front cover. Please let me know if you need the words to be explained if you choose to decipher them. As a clue, the cipher is 1:1 transpose based on a prime number associated with wrongdoing. (No prizes for cracking the code! The example was included to help illustrate the logical absurdity of the disparity between censorship on library computers and that in the media)

"Mpmallu uld ovslz zaylajolk huk wsbnnlk av aol the!!"

24. Free material on the Internet seems pretty tame by comparison. Almost every problem I have mentioned would essentially disappear if machines were made available for private viewing. The worst sites would be blocked by your servers and that would be the end of the matter. (Since writing this, it has become clear that this approach is indeed probably the best way of resolving the conflicting requirements for privacy and 'freedom of expression' and 'freedom to receive information' that have been at the centre of so much of the library debate on filtering, especially in the USA. No filter system is perfect but so long as most 'inappropriate' material is made unavailable, and the rest can be viewed in private by the few people who wish to do so, then everyone, on balance, will be as contented as they are ever likely to be. More discussion is included at filtering_pornography.htm). You cannot claim that smut is not a library function since neither is e-mail, which is essentially removing business from the Royal Mail. Both enable and encourage use of basic web systems. In fact, soft porn on the Internet is far more similar in its intended effects upon the person and upon society to smutty novels (which taxpayers are forced to provide) than e-mail is to anything you have provided before in libraries. Do you agree?

25. Instead therefore of a logical approach, we have mass surveillance of the innocent by the incompetent and the malevolent and a library system that already has declined by 25% in a decade (Independent 17 May 2002) being dragged into disrepute by an Authority far more concerned in truth in snooping than on proper protection of personal data on its own computers. Do you disagree? Please give me an interesting and quotable reply.(This is the core argument. Do we really want to move towards a society in which there is mass surveillance even of every webpage we view in a library on the pretext of doing social good by limiting viewing of what is freely available at any Internet cafe or UK On-line site? Since I wrote this letter proposals in the USA for TIAS have been much discussed - see Privacy Section of this website)

26. There is however an even more serious matter. Harm using the Internet is not primarily caused by sex sites. This is a lie perpetuated by national and especially local governments as a distraction from the consequences of their own activities and mistakes. Internet use to trace people, purportedly to trace lost relatives and discover family trees, has been responsible for many cases of arson and worse across the world. Retired prison officers have been traced by people seeking to settle an old score, ex-lovers revenge is often bitter, people seeking the location of children of ex girlfriends in defiance of Court Orders, and so on. Many people 'in the public eye' now hide behind false data on electoral rolls and similar. Are you aware of this?

27. The sites you should block are all those enabling tracing of people who may wish to retain privacy in their existing or a new life. This affects me not at all (I hardly seek anonymity) and if anyone tries tracing Dr Steve Wozniak on the Internet they get about 10000 references to one of the founders of Apple Computers - a man who knows a bit about hacking and the noble traditions of intellectual freedom. A couple more keystrokes bring up my personal details. It is obscene that Library Services promote tracing programs in full knowledge (I suppose) of the harm they continue to cause to vulnerable and often innocent people. The police of course are useless, they are far too busy checking library tickets, and they hold such extensive data bases (PNC, NCIS, DVLC (should have been DVLA) ) that they are reluctant to admit that data gathering may have its downsides. Routinely, they cannot even protect witnesses whose families have been traced. I have read that the collapse of the Jury system is owing in part to the Internet. It is now so easy using Land Registry data on open access, tracing programs and similar to find all the relatives of jurors (once you find where they live) and to apply pressure. This needs far greater publicity. I assume you are aware of the private investigations sites offering reverse electoral roll facilities and of checkmyfile and similar? Please comment as to whether you consider these should be available on library computers.

28. There is one possible legitimate use for these systems. It is alleged in a certain town, probably incorrectly, that xxxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxx((this text referred to allegations about a councillor and was deleted in the original letter)). I have not pursued the matter as yet.

29,30,31 . Paragraphs referring to personal addresses of DCC staff and DCC schools policies, deleted for now. Also para 31 centred upon some sites that I considered should be blocked or unblocked on the DCC server.

32. Do you consider it is part of your function (and under what legal authority?) to keep a log of which sites are visited by each and every user? Please give details of all logs that are kept and who has access to this data and under what circumstances. Please state for how long the data is kept. Please supply me with a copy of the surveillance log for my e-mail sites (some of which are not in my name but I am sure your snoops can trace them). I require this under the Data Protection Act. I also require under the Act details of logs kept (and why they have been kept) of occasions when my library ticket has been registered as 'having declined to accept terms and conditions'. I did not know until recently that your snooping computer registers every such event and displays the 'offending' ticket number. I require a full explanation here. Upon what authority do you collect these numbers and for what purpose?

33. I believe it is legal for any person to use other names (including to log onto your computers) so long as no deliberate deception bringing loss to others is thereby facilitated. (In simple terms, no fraud, no theft). This is one of the problems in combating identity fraud in the UK. I do not claim any particular legal expertise here but the strident denial in your Terms and Conditions of Use of the right to use a different name in the interests of privacy may have no merit. Please have your lawyers comment.

34. What procedures are in place within DCC to avoid parallel screens being used to capture confidential banking and other data input by library users? I am told such 'eavesdropping' can defeat encryption because data signals can be siphoned off as they are fed to screen (which occurs after de-encryption). Does DCC employ these procedures? Are you prepared to guarantee in writing to library users that it does not? Recently I saw data from the screen on PC1 in Sidmouth displayed on the snooping computer during clearout. I questioned Mrs Spence about this and was told I should refer the matter to you. Please see below also.(I have since learnt that DCC can intercept anything and everything. They can interrogate every hard disc on every machine remotely and can duplicate everything that has ever been printed out. Big Brother is alive and well in Devon!)

35. On whose authority and with what purpose were printers sited so that material may be produced only under surveillance of library staff who, in small towns especially, may be acutely interested in who is printing what, and why? I manage Internet bank and share dealing accounts both for myself and others (who are even less Internet literate) running well into six figures. Do you consider that you should deny me access to private printing of dealings and balance sheets, some of which, with Internet accounts are only readily available over the web? Any argument that rich people should buy and use their own computers is illogical. Our taxes pay for public services and we are entitled both to use them and to be afforded dignity and personal security. On 12 July I printed two posters in Sidmouth. Not only was my work displayed for all to see on the snooping computer but the girl even commented loudly on its content whilst printing it. As it happens, the work was for display purposes so privacy was unimportant. Is there some good reason why your staff have such a lack of common decency or is it how they have been trained to behave?

36. Do you wish to further stymie use of the government's (laughable) Inland Revenue income tax return on line procedure that the Treasury is keen to see adopted by many users, some of which will not have Internet computers of their own? Where is the privacy and respect for the individual in your systems as presently configured? At least you share one thing with the Revenue: incompetence in matters of data security. Do you expect people to be willing to use library computers for printing tax and other serious documents when there is such a lack of privacy? Please comment fully as I may need to broadcast your reply in the financial press and elsewhere.

37. I would suggest that it should be possible for printing to be done in a sealed enclosure or private area with the person whose work is being produced permitted to retrieve it without being overseen by a member of library staff or third party. I have few qualms about Sidmouth staff but again it is the principle that is at issue. This would be nothing more than a common respect for the individual. Please let me know if you intend forthwith to alter print arrangements in all Devon libraries so as not to discriminate against and disadvantage those persons who wish to manage money and tax affairs on-line. They should also be altered to reduce the amount of staff time involved. This would be straightforward in both hardware and software- so please do not tell me it is either difficult or impossible.

38. In like vein, what procedures are in place to prevent print buffers holding 'sensitive' data that a user might have required to be printed? Is clearance of the buffers guaranteed after each print run and is any record, electronic or otherwise, kept of which users have printed what material? During printing, is material sent directly from the library PC to the local printer or does it (and could it if so directed upon central command) travel via DCC HQ there perhaps to be intercepted by snoops? What written guarantees will you offer your users? (I have since learnt (see intern28.htm ) that exactly these duplicated print runs can occur.)

39. Why do the new systems seem to reboot all of MS Windows after each user session? Much delay is caused. Is this for virus protection? It will give the hard drives a 'hard time' too. I have discussed with Sidmouth staff the seemingly inefficient software used to control the PN computers. Why is 'clear out' a manually activated function even when the computer has timed out after a user has failed to 'end session'? Why cannot it be automatic and thereby bypass hard pressed staff whose failure to initiate the routine can lead to delays for users? Is the aim to protect data in case a user runs out of time? On a similar point of logic, what justification is there for all the notices in Sidmouth library saying "End Session to preserve privacy" when (see above) no privacy whatever has been afforded to users during their session? Do these notices represent deliberate sarcasm and provocation by your staff?

40. Why are all machines left switched on all the time when few if any are being used? This is against government energy conservation advice. Do the monitors have any energy saving mode (APM or ACPI)and if so is this activated? There are similar problems in many other libraries. Please state if any formal energy conservation advice has ever been given to your staff and/or if you had no choice in the type of equipment. Please state if you consider that public service officials and systems should set a good example to the public in matters of global importance. (DCC regularly extol the virtues of setting a good example in energy terms but seem reluctant to follow their own advice. More details later in the government incompetence section.)

41. I believe that a recent test case established (after many years) that it did not offend public decency for a man to walk naked down Oxford Street. I believe also that the case law is valid across the UK under the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994. Please comment on whether you consider such could cause offence in Sidmouth Library, and if so why and to whom. The siting of your computers and calculated lack of respect for privacy has caused offence and protest is in order. I require as a taxpayer that your librarians assist me by finding the references to this case on the Internet or otherwise. Please keep me informed of progress. I have previously found your reference staff at Exeter most helpful. I do hope that this continues. I would refer you also to the FT of 6/7 July 2002. Does anyone have a reference to this 'test case' that was publicised about a year or so ago, probably some time in 2001?

42. In both Exeter and Sidmouth libraries the only by-laws available date from 1990. Please confirm that current guidance to your staff in relation to purported authority to exclude members of the public (to 'ban ' them from DCC libraries) would not render them liable to action under Articles 5, 6, 7 of the Convention. I would in particular advise that staff do not seek to exclude or detain anyone without being entirely sure of their grounds and the legality of their actions. Your staff need to be aware of this and of the redress and remedy that may be sought. I have written separately to Mrs Spence. I have previously published articles locally concerning inept policing and may need to do so again. One XXXXXXX woman inspector was removed from Sidmouth some years ago and I am quite prepared to help get rid of another one. Attempts by the police or others acting with purported authority to coerce using threats that are illegal under the Human Rights Act can be dealt with using standard procedures. An article in the Daily Telegraph of 14 June (?) refers. Massive publicity could result. Would you welcome this?

43. In respect of suitable arrangements for location of computers in Sidmouth library and elsewhere the enclosed draft refers. Locating three or four machines in the reference library for absolutely quiet use and with privacy screens (and with users backs against the wall) would ensure that banking, share dealing, medical and (if wished) some mild sex sites could be viewed with no loss of amenity to any other library user. (I have since learnt that privacy is deliberately provided in some libraries, and I consider it should become standard practice. Examples from around the world would be welcome and are sought on page internet_privacy_help.htm). Other, more public terminals could be provided (as now) in the main library where drinking, kissing, fondling of genitals and thighs, reading sex novels, eating, talking, snooping and use of mobile phones seems freely permitted. The 'one location suits all' policy is illogical for diverse use. A letter sent to your colleague Roy Eden recently elaborates on this point and you should both obtain a copy and ensure a competent reply.

44. What happened to the old computers? Why could not these be used for student e-mail - which occupies the new machines for much of the time? Are old computers sold to staff for a few pounds or is the best price obtained? Please clarify procedures within DCC. Are machines offered to schools or charities or discarded?

45. Why is a policy adopted that discriminates against serious reference uses of the Internet yet no charges are made for e-mail? If computers are not being used yet they are switched on and contributing to global warming, why is a charge made for use after the first half hour if this is for work that essentially replaces searching expensive reference books these having been available all day if desired? Given that the Internet is replacing reference works, and that your stocks of these will become (and in the case of Sidmouth, have become) out of date and are expensive to update why are users essentially penalised for using a library for its traditional function? Logically, e-mail should be charged and all other uses should be both free initially, and free for as long as no-one else wants to use the machine. It has been suggested to me that computers should be stripped out of libraries and put in Internet cafes where users could pay a small fee to e-mail without disrupting proper library functions. The (few) computers left in libraries would be used only for serious purposes. Please comment.

46. It would be easy either using stand alone electronic timers or software (adapted from that currently installed) to time the first half hour. Thereafter if that machine was not required by anyone else, it could continue to be used but its 'availability upon demand' would be signalled both on screen and on the central snooping computer used by staff. Subsequently, if anyone else came along and wanted to use a machine the person who had been logged on for the longest time would be required to vacate. Given proper access to Internet reference facilities you could save money by running down reference stocks. I am here encouraging you to consider that you have machines idle when they should be available for free use for core library functions. The argument that you would lose money is invalid. If properly set up the system would run itself with a lower level of staff supervision - and it is getting rid of staff that is the priority for cost reduction. Please let me know if your illogical systems are based on a nationally agreed plan or were formulated within DCC.

47. Please clarify the position if two or more people jointly wish to use a computer for consecutive periods. It is normal in Sidmouth for partners or friends to follow each other, and in effect each has use of the machine for an hour. Are four people allowed two hours with perhaps one doing most of the work? Fair policies must be applied and the rules known in advance and applied equally in all cases. Is the person in whose name the machine is booked required to be at the terminal throughout the period?

48. Using the computerised log in system it should be possible to determine the percent of time each available computer is used over a period of (say) four months. Please let me know if this is being done and if not why not. Also, when is data to be released on how much money has been taken in fees for using machines for longer than half and hour?

49 It is sometimes desired to use the Internet for a few minutes, do something else and then return to it. Under the present booking system this is not possible without being charged. It would be easy to devise that the snooping computer keeps a record of time allocated to each user on a daily basis and automatically allows two or more sessions per day to a total time of (say) 30 minutes, thereafter to be allowed only if no new users wished to claim a slot. Little staff intervention would be required and the data would be cleansed from the system daily to comply with data protection norms that personal data should not be stored unless there is a valid reason for doing so. Please comment.

50 In a few weeks or months time I shall wish to use computers for reference purposes over extended periods to gather information to set an 'exam'. I wish to know if this will be charged, given that I shall be using a reference and lending library in the UK for one of its core functions such having traditionally been provided free of charge at the point of use. Paragraph deleted. Your answers will have significance for all library use in the UK and you should ensure they represent DCC forward policy.

51 Please clarify the extent to which computerised records are kept of which books have been issued against which library tickets. Are records erased (including from back-up systems) when a book is returned. There has been some discussion about the FBI in the USA requiring similar records from libraries.

There followed a few paragraphs to end the letter, including requests for e-mail addresses of DCC staff and other lending libraries in the UK. None were ever provided.

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